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A Comparative Analysis of the EU
Regulation Governing the Automotive
Industry and the U.S. Antitrust Law:
Suggestions for the Block Exemption
Regulation 1400/2002
I. INTRODUCTION

The European Union ("EU") has a number of sector-specific
competition laws, called Block Exemption Regulations ("BERs").
Among them, the EU Commission ("Commission") recently
revised a BER governing the automotive industry, Commission
Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 ("the third BER").' While the third
BER became effective in October 2003,2 controversies have arisen
about its rules and effects because it has unique and experimental
features. Further, the expansion of the EU made the situation
even more complicated.3 Within the automotive industry, car
manufacturers, wholesalers, and dealers have been struggling to
find out the third BER's market impact and to develop strategies
for maximizing profits and complying with the new rules.4 At the
same time, they have been vigorously negotiating terms of their
new relationship in the changing market environment.!

1. See Commission Regulation No 1400/2002 of July 31, 2002, on the Application of
Article 81(3) to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor
Vehicle Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30 (EC).
2. Id. art. 10.
3. See The EU at a Glance:
The History of the European Union,
http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index en.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter
History].
4. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, TVR Reminds Dealer Network to
Comply with EU Block Exemption Regulation (Jan. 24, 2006) (on file with Office of Fair
Trading), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2006/13-06; Wheels Turningfor Big
Changes, But Auto Sector Remains Flexible, PRAGUE BUSINESS JOURNAL, Dec. 15, 2003
[hereinafter Wheels Turning].
5. See, e.g., Wheels Turning, supra note 4.
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Even though the third BER made significant progress
compared to the former BER, it does not fully integrate the
automotive market and maximize consumer benefits in the EU.
Thus, the third BER may adversely affect the automotive industry.
This Comment will discuss the rules of the new BER6 and provide
policy suggestions for the next legislation scheduled in 2010.' Part
II provides a general overview of the historical and legal
background. Part III analyzes the new rules in comparison with
rules of United States ("U.S.") competition law.8 Part IV discusses
the market impact of the third BER. Finally, Part V evaluates the
progress and limitations of the third BER and makes policy
suggestions.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Historicaland Legal Background
Reflecting the goal of a unified market within the EU9 that
will benefit the consumer,"0 Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community prohibits any agreement directly or
indirectly restricting competition and trade among countries."
However, Article 81(3) also provides that Article 81(1) would not
apply to any agreement that improves the production or
distribution of goods or promotes technical or economic progress
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. 2
Whether the benefits outweigh the anti-competitive effects
depends on the market structure and is generally determined
through an individual assessment.'3 Additionally, the Commission

6. This Comment focuses on the competition laws at the European Community
level, which governs vertical restraints in the context of dealership agreements for the sale
of vehicles and after-sales service.
7. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 12, para. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 41 (EC).
8. In the end, the relationship between the EU member countries would be
substantially the same as that of states in the United States. In that sense, the comparative
analysis of the new BER and the U.S. competition laws governing automotive industries
would be very useful background for evaluating the new BER and developing suggestions
for the next legislation.
9. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
23, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
10. Id. art. 153.
11. Id. art. 81(1).
12. Id. art. 81(3).
13. European Commission, Competition Directorate General, Distribution and
Servicing of Motor Vehicles in the European Union: Explanatory Brochure on
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can grant exemptions for a whole category of agreements by
Commission
enacting BERs." The Commission enacted
Regulation 2790/1999 as a general BER that applies to vertical
agreements in all sectors of industry and trade." However, this
regulation does not apply where the Commission adopts a sectorspecific BER. 6

Along this line, the Commission enacted sector-specific
regulations for some industries including the automotive industry. 7
After enacting the first'8 and the second' 9 BERs governing the
automotive industry in 1985 and 1995 respectively, the
Commission published the third BER, which became fully
effective on October 1, 2003, after a one-year transition period."
B. Legislative Intent

In 2000, the Commission issued a report that evaluated the
second BER, Regulation 1475/95.21 The report found that:

(1)

consumers did not derive a fair share of benefits from the former
system, (2) competition between car dealers was not strong
enough, (3) car dealers remained too dependent on car
manufacturers, and (4) consumers found it difficult to make use of
their single market right to take advantage of price differentials
between member countries.22
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the applicationof Article
81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the
Motor Vehicle Sector, at 8 (2002) [hereinafter Explanatory Brochure], available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/car-sector/explanatory-brochure-en.pdf.
14. Id.; Council Regulation 1215/1999, paras. (1)-(2), 1999 O.J. (L 148) 1 (EC); EC
Treaty, supra note 9, art. 211.
15. See Commission Regulation 2790/1999, arts. 4-5, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21, 23-24 (EC).
16. See Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13, at 8.
17. Memorandum, Competition Directorate General, The Commission Regulation
for a New Motor Vehicle Block Exemption - Questions and Answers - Background
Information on Press Release IP/02/1073 (July 17, 2002) [hereinafter Questions and
Answers],
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/02/174&
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
18. See Commission Regulation 123/85, 1985 O.J. (L 15) 16 (EC).
19. See Commission Regulation 1475/95, 1995 O.J. (L 145) 25 (EC).
20. See Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 10, 2002 0.. (L 203) 30, 40 (EC).
21. Commission Report on the Evaluation of Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 on the
Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle
Distributionand Servicing Agreements, COM (2000) 743 final (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter
Report],
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/
Evaluation
2000/com2000_0743en01.pdf.
22. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Adopts Comprehensive
Reform of Competition Rules for Car Sales and Servicing, IP/02/1073, at 2 (July 17, 2002)
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Along this line, the Commission decided to make "smooth
but real" changes for the third BER. 3 Among the most important
aims were to make cross-border purchases of new vehicles
significantly easier, increase competition between dealers, and
create greater price competition. 4 Thus, the third BER now
prohibits many trade restraints allowed under the first and the
second BERs. 2' Therefore, the third BER made significant and
substantial progress toward creating a unified free-trade
automotive market in the EU.
C. Standardof Review
BERs confer a presumption of legality.26 Thus, a dealership
agreement that meets the third BER's requirements would be
presumed legal under Article 81(1). However, if an agreement
contains any restraints listed in Article 4 (Hardcore Restrictions)
of the third BER, the whole agreement cannot benefit from the
block exemption and will be subject to proceedings for individual
exemption. 2 Because the individual exemption of vertical
agreements containing Hardcore Restrictions is unlikely,' any2
violation of the rules in Article 4 would be deemed per se illegal

[hereinafter Comprehensive Reform Press Release], http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/02/1073&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage
=en; Questions and Answers, supra note 17.

23. Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Speech at the
Ninth Annual European Automotive Conference: Car Retailing at a Crossroads, The
New Legal Framework for Car Distribution (Feb. 6, 2003), http://europa.eu/rapid/

pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/03/59&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en.
24. Comprehensive Reform Press Release, supra note 22.
25. Id.; Questions and Answers, supra note 17, at 2.
26. Commission Notice 291/01, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, section III, para.
1(21), 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1, 6 (EC).
27. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 38-39 (EC);
Explanatory Brochure,supra note 13, at 28.
28. Commission Notice 291/01, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, section III, para.
3(46), 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1, 11 (EC).
29. See, e.g., Case C-235/92, Montecatini SpA v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 1-4539, para.

132 (holding that analysis on competitive effects was not necessary because there was no
doubt that an agreement to fix prices and to limit production constituted per se
infringement); Case T-112/99, M~tropole T6lvision v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 11-2459,

paras. 72-78 ("IT]he existence of a rule of reason in Community competition law is
doubtful.").
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similarly as certain vertical restraints are per se illegal under U.S.
rules. "
Where an agreement includes any of seven restrictions
prohibited by Article 5 (Specific Conditions), the block exemption
would not apply, and the restriction would be subject to the
individual assessment while the remaining part of the agreement
may continue to benefit from the block exemption.31 For the
individual exemption, a party must show its agreement meets the
conditions of Article 81(3), which are similar with the considering
factors under the rule of reason.32 If an agreement does not meet
any of five conditions in Article 3 (General Conditions) other than
the market threshold requirement, a party must show why the
absence of relevant provisions helps to attain, or does not obstruct
the attainment of, the positive effects mentioned in Article 81(3).
D. Scope
The third BER governs vertical agreements among
suppliers and buyers 4 regarding the sale of new passenger
commercial vehicles, parts, and after-sales service35 within
6 The EEA includes
European Economic Area ("EEA")."

car
and
the
EU

30. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)
(Certain agreements or practices which have pernicious effect on competition and lacks
any redeeming virtue would be conclusively presumed to be illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the actual harm they have caused or the business justification for their use. In
the context of vertical restraints, the per se illegality applies to minimum resale price
maintenance (RPM) while the maximum RPM is subject to the per se rule unless it
involves predatory pricing or horizontal arrangements); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
31. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 5, at 39; Explanatory Brochure, supra note
13, at 30.
32. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49-50. Under U.S. rules, Agreements or practices
falling outside the per se illegal category are subject to the rule of reason. Under the rule
of reason, the fact-finding weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether the
anti-competitive effects outweigh the pro-competitive effects; therefore, a restrictive
practice should be prohibited.
33. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 3, at 37-38; Explanatory Brochure, supra
note 13, at 25.
34. "Buyer" is a party who sells goods or services on behalf of a supplier. A
wholesaler in an agreement with a car manufacturer, a dealer in an agreement with a
wholesaler, and a repairer in an after-sales service contract would become a buyer. A
customer is not deemed a buyer but categorized as an end user. Commission Regulation
1400/2002, art. 1(k), (w), at 35-36.
35. Id. para. (3), at 30. Used motor vehicles or motor cycles are not subject to this
regulation; see Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13, at 40.
36. Under the principle of primacy of Community law, the Commission regulations
uniformly apply throughout the Common Market without being prejudiced by any
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member countries, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and territories
in Africa and Latin America such as Canary Island, Merilla, Ceuta,
and Reunion.37 Due to the enlargement of the EU, the scope and
market impact of the third BER have become even more
extensive. In addition to the ten Eastern European countries that
became new members of the EU since May 2004,"8 Romania and
Bulgaria are scheduled to become members of the EU this year,

and Croatia and Turkey are negotiating for membership.3 9
However, the exemption of the third BER from Article 81(1)
would not apply to a vertical agreement where a contracting party
has dominant market power.' In the situation that a supplier or a
buyer has a high market share41 within a relevant market, the
agreement would be subject to the proceeding for individual
exemption.2 In the proceeding, the Commission bears the burden
of proving that the agreement fails to comply with Article 81(1)
and that the agreement does not meet all four conditions of Article
81(3)."3 If the parties fail to get an individual exemption, they may
be exposed to fines or damages before national competition
authorities or the Commission."

national authorities. See, e.g., Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585
(holding that the laws of the European Community bind and directly apply in all member
states and their nationals without being prejudiced by any precedent or subsequent law of
member states).
37. Explanatory Slides, Competition Directorate General, The New Motor Vehicle
Block Exemption Regulation - The Current Rules and the New Rules 3,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/car-sector/ber.slides-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,
2007) [hereinafter The Current Rules and the New Rules].
38. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Protocol 9, Dec. 12, 2004, 2004
O.J. (C 310) 297, 298-301.
39. History, supra note 3.
40. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 3, paras. 1-2, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 37
(EC).
41. The threshold for a supplier or a buyer's market share is generally 30 percent.
However, the threshold is 40 percent where a quantitative selective system is established.
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
42. Commission Notice 291/01, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, section IV, para.
2(84), 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1, 17 (EC).
43. Id. section IV, para 1(72), at 16.
44. The Commission and national competition authorities (NCA) have the right to
make decisions on cases which involves in Article 81. While any individual can claim
damages for loss caused by a contract or by conduct which restricts competition, only
national courts can grant damages to an individual in case of an infringement of Article 81.
The Commission focuses on the most serious infringements or the cases that the
Commission should act on to define Community competition policy or to ensure coherent
application of Article 81. Commission Notice 101/05, section II.A-B, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 65,
65-67 (EC); see Council Regulation 1/2003, arts. 6-7, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 9 (EC).

2007]

EU BERs for the Automotive Industry

On the other hand, where the contracting parties' market
shares are so low " that the agreement would not appreciably
restrict competition under Article 81(1), the exemption would
apply to a vertical agreement as long as it does not contain any of
thirteen severely anti-competitive restraints listed in Article 4 of
the BER."6 Thus, the exemption may apply to an agreement
between parties with low market share even when the agreement
does not comply with the general or specific conditions provided in
Article 3 and 5 of the third BER. 7
III. RULES OF THE THIRD BER IN COMPARISON WITH U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS

Whereas the third BER applies quite similar rules to vertical
price restraints, it generally applies stricter rules than U.S. law.
Even though it would promote intra-brand competition and
independence of dealers more efficiently than the former BER,
the third BER may have some adverse effects on market efficiency
and consumer benefits.
A. Direct Restraints on Trade: Sales to Customers, Resellers, and
Intermediaries
To avoid confining car manufacturers, wholesalers, and
dealers to a single rigid system, 8 the new Regulation allows them
to choose one of three different types of car distribution systems:
(1) exclusive system, (2) selective distribution system, and (3)
combined system. 9 While some direct restraints on vehicle trade
among the countries would be allowed under one system, the
Hardcore Restriction rule prohibits the same restraints under
another system." However, U.S. law generally applies the rule of
reason to vertical non-price restraints unless it involves a
horizontal arrangement or a monopoly.

45. Generally, market share thresholds for this exception are 15 percent for vehicle
sales and 5 percent for after-sales service. Commission Notice on agreements of minor
importance, section II, para. 7, 2001 O.J. (C 368) 13, 13-14 (EC); Explanatory Brochure,
supra note 13, at 21-23.
46. Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13, at 23.
47. See id.
48. Comprehensive Reform Press Release, supra note 22.
49. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 35-36 (EC).
50. See id. art. 4, at 38-39.
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1. Exclusive System
An "Exclusive System" is a distribution system in which the
supplier sells the contract goods only to one buyer within the
territory defined in the contract.51 Moreover, this system allows the
supplier to prohibit the buyer from performing active sales52 to end
5
53
users outside the territory. For example, while the supplier
cannot directly sell a vehicle to any wholesaler or dealer other than
those within the contracting parties in Germany, the supplier can
prohibit its wholesaler or dealer from actively approaching end

users outside the German market.
However, the supplier cannot prohibit the buyer from selling
to resellers inside or outside the territory56 or passively selling
vehicles or services to end users outside the territory.57 Therefore,
the dealer in The Netherlands can sell vehicles to the end users
who directly or indirectly approach its shops and make orders.
Further, the dealer in The Netherlands can sell vehicles to any
reseller inside or outside The Netherlands who does not have any
contractual relationship with the supplier, and the reseller can sell
the vehicles to any end user in Italy or France.

51. Id. art. 1, para. 1(e), at 35.
52. Id. art. 4, para. (1)(b)(i), at 38. "Active Sales" means selling vehicles or services by
actively approaching to end users. For example, the seller may directly send mails, visit
end users through advertisement in media or other promotions or establish a warehouse
or sales or delivery outlet to facilitate dealings with customers or their intermediaries.
Explanatory Brochure,supra note 13, at 30.
53. "End user" includes "end users who have given authorisation to an intermediary
or purchasing agent to purchase, take delivery of, transport or store a new motor vehicle
on their behalf." Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, para. 1(w), at 36.
54. Id. art. 4, para. 1(b)(i), at 38..
55. "Reseller" is any undertaking that purchases vehicles for the purpose of resale
before they receive any order from its customers. In this comment, it generally addresses
car dealers with whom a specific car manufacturer does not have any contractual
relationship. See Explanatory Brochure,supra note 13, at 45.
56. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(b)(iii), at 38.
57. See id. art. 4, para. 1(d)-(e); "Passive sales" include vehicle sales through
intermediaries. An "intermediary" is a person or an undertaking that purchases vehicles
under prior authorizations of consumers. Even though the intermediary sales was allowed
under the second BER, its effect in promoting cross-border sales has been limited because
dealers could not be independent enough to use this scheme in the exclusive dealing
context and suppliers could use other indirect restrictions on intermediary sales which the
third BER prohibits. However, because internet sales have been increasing and the third
BER would strengthen independence of car dealers, the intermediary sales would
substantially increase cross-border sales. Commission Regulation 1475/95, art 3(11), 1995
O.J. (L 145) 25 (EC).
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These new rules would more effectively promote intra-brand
competition than those of the second BER. Under the second
BER, the supplier could not prohibit its dealers from passively
selling vehicles to end users outside the territory.58 However, the
supplier could prohibit its dealers from actively selling,' and from
selling vehicles to resellers. 6 Therefore, car manufacturers could
effectively control the flow of vehicles among EU member
countries. However, the supplier under the exclusive system
cannot limit systematic and massive cross-border sales performed
through unauthorized resellers. This is one of the important
reasons why many car manufacturers did not choose the exclusive
system.
However, the new rules are somewhat less flexible than U.S.
law. Under U.S. rules, the rule of reason generally applies to a
vertical non-price restraint about territory, reseller sales,6" and
customers, unless it involves horizontal arrangements or
monopolies.62 To determine the legality of a restraint under the
rule of reason, courts examine whether its pro-competitive effect
outweighs the anti-competitive effect by considering various
factors such as market power of a supplier or a dealer, the purpose
and nature of the restraint, and a business justification for the
restraint.63 On the other hand, under the third BER, while
restraints on active sales are legal per se, Article 4 prohibits
vertical restraints on reseller sales and passive sales to the territory
of exclusive system. ' Therefore, even when the restriction on
reseller sales promotes competition, it would be prohibited, while
the restriction on active sales would be simply allowed even when
it limits competition.

58.

Commission Regulation 1475/95, art. 3, 1995 O.J. (L 145) 25 (EC).

59. Id. art. 3(8)-(9).
60. Id. art. 3(10).
61. A supplier often obligates, in its contracts, dealers not to sell the products to any
person other than end users who purchases the products for the purpose of resale.
62. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977) (overruling
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
THE LAW OF
63. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST POLICY:
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICES 483-88 (Thomas West 2005) (1994).
64. Further, Recitals 12 to 26 of the third BER expressly set out some indirect
restrictions which may constitute Hardcore Restrictions. For example, if an agreement
includes a supply quota based on a sales territory as set forth in Recital 16, the whole
agreement including the supply quota clause would not benefit the block exemption.
Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 38-39 (EC); see
Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13, at 29.
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2. Selective System
A "Selective System" is a distribution system where a supplier
sells vehicles only to dealers selected on the basis of specified
criteria." Under a selective system, the supplier can prohibit
dealers from selling vehicles to unauthorized resellers 6 but cannot
prohibit dealers from actively or passively selling vehicles to end
users outside the territory. 7 For example, the dealers in Germany
cannot sell vehicles inside or outside Germany but can directly
advertise to end users, establish sales or delivery outlets,6 and
actively sell vehicles in France or Italy.
There are two types of selective systems:
quantitative
selective distribution systems and qualitative selective distribution
systems. Under a quantitative selective system, suppliers can use
criteria directly limiting the number of wholesalers or dealers.6"
However, under a qualitative selective system, suppliers set forth
qualitative criteria" for selection and should authorize any dealer
that satisfies such criteria. Therefore, it cannot directly limit the
number of dealers.'
For non-luxury car manufacturers, the quantitative selective
system was a better choice than the qualitative selective system.
Unlike luxury brands,72 most car manufacturers cannot set forth a
high level of criteria. 73 Therefore, under the qualitative selective
system, many car manufacturers cannot effectively limit the
number of authorized dealers who can actively and passively sell
vehicles to end users outside the territory.
In contrast, if the manufacturer sets forth criteria limiting the
number of the wholesaler to just one, the quantitative system
becomes the most similar system to the exclusive system under the
second BER. Further, until October 1, 2005, car manufacturers
65. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, para. 1(f), 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 35
(EC).

66. Id.
67. Id. art. 4, para. 1(d), at 38.
68. Id. art. 5, para. 2(b), at 39.
69. Id. art. 1, para. 1(g), at 35.
70. Examples of qualitative criteria include training requirement for sales personnel,
qualification of after-sales personnel, requirements on product display, and dedicated
space for each brand in showroom. The Current Rules and the New Rules, supra note 37.
71. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, para. 1(h), at 35.
72. In the case of luxury brands, car manufacturers usually have very high level of
criteria which dealers cannot easily satisfy; therefore, luxury brands may prefer qualitative
selective system. The Current Rules and the New Rules, supra note 37.
73. Id.
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could use a "location clause" prohibiting wholesalers or dealers
from establishing sales or delivery outlets outside the territory.74
Therefore, many car manufacturers have chosen the quantitative
selective system over other systems and maintained a location
clause in their contracts. 5 However, since October 1, 2005, a
supplier under the selective system cannot effectively limit
systematic and massive cross-border sales through sales outlets
outside the territories."

Unlike U.S. lawn the third BER again applies per se rules to
vertical restraints on reseller sales, passive sales, and active sales in
the context of selective system."8 Therefore, even when the
restriction on active sales has a justifiable purpose and effect, it
would still be prohibited, while the restriction on reseller sales
would be simply allowed even when it limits the competition.
3. Combined System
The new BER does not obligate a supplier to use only one
system within the common market.79 Therefore, a supplier can use
the exclusive system in one territory and the selective system in
another. Under this combined system, a selective distribution
agreement cannot restrict passive sales to any end user or
unauthorized distributor located in territories under the exclusive
system, nor can an exclusive distribution agreement restrict active
or passive sales to any end user or unauthorized distributor located
in markets under the selective system. ° Thus, because it would be
extremely hard to control cross-border flows of vehicles under the
combined system,81 manufacturers may not choose this system

74. DaimlerChrysler, Ford, Toyota, and BMW adopted the selective system
maintaining location clause in their distribution agreements. See Wim Oude Weernink &
Bradford Wernle, Carmakers Can Keep EU Location Clause, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS
EUROPE, Aug. 22, 2005.
75. Id.
76. Explanatory Brochure,supra note 13, at 52-55.
77. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977).
78. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(d), 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 38
(EC).
79. European Commission, Competition Directorate General, Frequently Asked
Block
Exemption, available at
Motor
Vehicle
Questions on
the New
[hereinafter
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/car-sector/distribution/faq-en.pdf
FAQ]; see Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4.1(d), 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30.
80. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(d), at 38.
81. FAQ, supra note 79.
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unless they need to incur vigorous intra-brand competition among
dealers.
B. Indirect Restraints on Trade
In addition to the rules governing direct restraints for
different distribution systems, the new BER also provides rules
governing indirect restraints of vehicle trade among countries,
regardless of the system. Under the new rules, car manufacturers
cannot effectively restrict cross-border sales of vehicles as they
could in the past by means of indirect constraints.82
1. Agreement Requirement and Refusal to Deal
Both Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty83 and Section 1 of the
Sherman Act' require a plaintiff with a vertical restraint claim to
show an agreement or a concerted arrangement between a
manufacturer and a dealer. Where a dealer expressly or impliedly
agrees to follow a vertical restraint set forth by a supplier, a claim
would usually be initiated by competition authorities such as the
Federal Trade Commission or the European Commission, and the
dealer's consent would form an agreement. However, where a
dealer refuses to follow such a restraint and a supplier in response
terminates or refuses to renew the dealership agreement, after
initiating a claim, the dealer or a competition authority as a
plaintiff has to show an agreement between the manufacturer and
another dealer.
In the latter case, the third BER confers more protection on
dealers from retaliatory terminations by suppliers than U.S. rules
while it takes quite similar approaches with U.S. rules as to a nonrenewal of a dealership agreement.' The third BER expressly
prohibits a supplier from terminating an agreement for the reason
that a dealer or a repairer engages in pro-competitive behavior
such as active or passive sales, reseller sales, or price-cutting.'
82. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, at 38-39.
83. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 81(1); see also Case T-208/01, Volkswagen A.G. v.
Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-5141.
84. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides "Every contract, combination . . . or

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . . is hereby
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005); see United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300 (1919).
85. Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13, at 58-60.
86. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 3, para. 4, at 37; Explanatory Brochure,

supra note 13, at 58-60.
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When terminating a dealership or service agreement before the
end of the contract term,' a supplier has to give to a buyer prior
notice in writing that includes "detailed, objective and transparent
reasons" for the termination.' Further, the regulation expressly
manifests that it requires the prior notice in order to prevent a
supplier from terminating an agreement based on a buyer's procompetitive conduct." Therefore, whether the reasons for
termination are well-founded are a question of fact, and any
retaliatory termination for a dealer's pro-competitive conducts
would be deemed a "serious indirect restriction" of competition.'
In contrast, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a supplier
can legally terminate a dealership agreement even after receiving
another dealer's complaint about price-cutting. 91 In U.S. v. Colgate
& Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that "in the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,"92 a supplier can freely
exercise its own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal; further, a supplier may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.93 Therefore, a
court would not infer the existence of an agreement merely from
the fact that a supplier terminated a contract with a dealer after
another dealer complained about the terminated dealer's pricecutting. 4 Rather, there must be evidence tending to exclude the
possibility that the manufacturer and the non-terminated dealers

87. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 3, para. 5, at 37 (providing that under the
new regulation, a contract term should be indefinite or at least five years); see also
ExplanatoryBrochure, supra note 13, at 59.

88. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 3, para. 4, at 37 (providing that the block
exemption shall apply only when a vertical agreement provides that a supplier must give
such prior notice to a buyer).
89. Id.
90.

Id.

91. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984).
92. The. issue of refusals to deal can appear in various forms such as horizontally
concerted refusals, vertically concerted refusals, and unilateral refusals. Generally, the
refusal to deal based on a supplier's best interest would be lawful unless it is to create or
maintain a monopoly, there is neither horizontal nor vertical agreement for the refusal,
and the supplier's conduct does not amount to threat or intimidation. See Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
143 (1951); Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763-64; Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1221-1222 (2005).
93. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
94. Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763-64.
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acted independently.9" Therefore, a plaintiff has to show direct or
circumstantial evidence that the manufacturer and the nonterminated dealers had a "conscious commitment to a common
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective."96 Technically,
under the Sherman Act, a "manufacturer is free to establish resale
pricing standards and to refuse to sell to distributors not
conforming to the manufacturer's standards" 97 while the third BER
expressly prohibits such retaliatory terminations."
In the case of the refusal to renew the contract, under the
third BER, a supplier can give its dealer just six months prior
notice without explaining reasons for its refusal to renew a fixedterm contract. 9 However, the third BER still improves dealers'
independence from the supplier by requiring a dealership contract
term to be more than five years' 0 and enables dealers to engage in
the sale of competing vehicles."' In general, the new Regulation
would significantly promote the independence of dealers in
performing pro-competitive activities.
2. Price Restraints
In the context of a vertical agreement, the third BER better
protects a dealer's ability to determine independently resale prices
of vehicles than U.S. law.
a. Minimum RPM
As U.S. law applies a per se rule to minimum resale price
maintenance ("RPM"), 2 the new BER categorizes minimum RPM
as a Hardcore Restriction.' Therefore, in both the U.S. and the

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. William K. Jones, Book Note, Concerted Behavior Under the Antitrust Laws, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1986, 1991 (1986) (reviewing PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1986)) (citing United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 33 (1960)).

98. ExplanatoryBrochure, supra note 13, at 40-45.
99. Id. at 60.
100. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 3, para. 5(a), 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 37
(EC).
101. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the issue of non-compete obligation).
102. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36. 51 (1977).
103. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(a), at 38. Even under the second
BER, the Commission strictly applied the rule to Volkswagen's retail price maintenance
measure in Germany in spite of Volkswagen's justification that the measures were
necessary to support its dealers' profitability and to preserve the brand image of the new
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EU, minimum price RPM is prohibited even when such a measure
has a justifiable purpose and effect on competition.
However, in the context of vertical restraints, the third BER
is stricter than the Sherman Act. While the third BER categorizes
as the minimum RPM a restraint that affects the resale price, such
as limitations, financial disincentives, pressures or obstacles," a
vertical agreement would not be deemed a price agreement in the
U.S. unless the plaintiff can establish an "agreement on price or
price level."'' 5
b. Maximum RPM
The third BER's approach to the maximum RPM differs from
the approach under U.S. law because it expressly allows the
maximum RPM, 6 while under U.S. rules the maximum RPM is
subject to the rule of reason unless it involves predatory pricing or
horizontal arrangements.'07 The third BER would generally allow
the maximum RPM unless it amounts to a violation of other
competition rules such as predatory pricing, while U.S. courts will
examine the entirety of the circumstances such as its purpose and
effect on competition.'
3. Market Discrimination
Under the third BER, a supplier cannot limit a dealer's sale to
consumers outside the territory, in the form of any discriminatory
product supply, since the new BER categorizes this as a Hardcore
Restriction.' 9 For example, a supplier may not provide different
model. See Commission Decision 98/273/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 124) 60; Press Release,
European Commission, Commission Imposes a E 30.96 Million Fine on Volkswagen AG
for Retail Price Maintenance Measures on the German Market, IP/01/760 (May 30, 2001),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/760&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
104. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(a), at 38; Explanatory Brochure,
supra note 13, at 27-30.
105. Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988). However, in
the context of a horizontal arrangement, even an agreement that merely affects price
would be illegal per se. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil. Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
106. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(a), at 38.
107. State Oil C6. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997). However, a per se rule applies to the
horizontal maximum RPM. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347
(1982).
108. The predatory pricing would be governed by Article 82 of the EC Treaty which
prohibits the abuse of dominant position while it is subject to Section 2 of the Sherman
Act in the U.S. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 82; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2005).
109. See Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(b), at 38.
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remuneration or a bonus based on destination of the vehicles or on
the place of residence of the consumers. 0 Further, a supplier
cannot delay the delivery of the vehicles without justifiable
reason.I' Therefore, consumers can buy vehicles anywhere in the
common market without unreasonable discrimination as to price
or delivery. This rule is similar with U.S. rules. Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, the supplier' can justify the price
discrimination by showing that there is cost justification"2 or that it
is necessary to compete in good faith."3
4. Non-Compete Obligation: Exclusive Dealing
The new BER applies stricter rules to the non-compete
obligation"' than either the second BER or the U.S. law."5 Under
the second BER, a supplier could prohibit wholesalers and dealers
from selling competitors' vehicles by obligating them to establish a
separate legal entity and use different premises when selling
competing products."6' As a result, a dealer's business was so
heavily dependent on a car manufacturer's business that a dealer
could not make independent business decisions in most cases."'
In the U.S., Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
apply to the exclusive dealing. Under the Sherman Act, the courts
would apply the rule of reason. Even though the rule under the
Clayton Act has not been settled yet, the courts basically adopt the
rule of reason by considering the relevant market definition and
the general effect of the arrangement."8
However, under the third BER, dealers can freely
manufacture, purchase, display or sell competitors' vehicles."9
Further, a supplier cannot require wholesalers or dealers to
purchase the contract goods more than thirty percent of their total

110.

Id. para. (16), at 31.

111. Explanatory Brochure,supra note 13, at 41.
112. See United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
113. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 451 (1978).
114. "Non-compete Obligation" is any obligation causing the buyer not to
manufacture, purchase, sell or resell goods or services which compete with the contract
goods or services." Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, para. l(b), at 35.
115. Id.; see also Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13.
116. Commission Regulation 1475/95, art. 3(3), 1995 O.J. (L 145) 25 (EC).
117. Evaluation Report, supra note 21, at 73-77.
118. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
119. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, para. l(b), at 35.
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purchases.'2 ° Although, to avoid brand confusion, a supplier can
ask wholesalers or dealers to meet corporate identity requirements
such as a separate showroom or brand specific area within a
showroom, an obligation that makes sales of competing models
"difficult in practical or cost-related terms" may amount to a noncompete obligation. ' Further, a supplier can require a dealer to
have brand-specific sales personnel only when the dealer
voluntarily decides to have such personnel and the supplier pays
all additional costs. '
5. Other Indirect Restraints
A supplier can indirectly restrain vehicle trade by limiting the
number of vehicles supplied and the availability of products or
after-sales services. Generally, the rule of reason applies to such
restraints in the U.S.'23 while the third BER categorizes these
practices as Hardcore Restrictions.' 4 Thus, car manufacturers
cannot limit cross-border trade as they could under the old rules,
and dealers and repairers can make business decisions more
independently.
a. Availability Clause
Under the third BER, suppliers cannot refuse to provide to
dealers vehicles with specifications available in any other Member
State.' 5 Under the second BER, manufacturers could indirectly
restrict cross-border sales by limiting availability of versions or
optional features of a model.'26 For example, even when a
consumer in the UK could buy a Corolla from Greece at a lower
price, Toyota could hinder the customer from buying the car by
120. Id.
121. FAQ, supra note 79.
122. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, para. 1(b), at 35.
123. These practices could be subject to the Robinson-Patman Act as the indirect
market discrimination or Section 2 of the Sherman Act as the attempt to create or
maintain a monopoly in a certain market. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. In the former
case, a defendant can defend by showing business justification or good-faith meeting
competition. In the latter, courts would apply the rule of reason in order to distinguish an
efficient and competitive conduct from an inefficient and anti-competitive conduct. See
United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911).
124. Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13, at 27-30.
125. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, para. (20), at 32, art. 4, para. 1(f), at 38.
126. Commission Regulation 1475/95, 1995 O.J. (L 145) 25.
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not providing any right-hand-drive Corollas to dealers in Greece.
Under the third BER, however, a supplier cannot hinder a dealer
or a wholesaler from selling a new motor vehicle that corresponds
to a model within its contract range.' Therefore, a consumer in
the UK can buy a right-hand-drive Corolla from dealers in any
other Member State.'28
b. Supply Quota and Cross-supplies
Under the new BER, a supplier cannot limit the number of
vehicles that a dealer can purchase, in the form of sales quota
based on a sales territory' 29 and a dealer's ability to purchase
contract vehicles from the supplier or other authorized wholesalers
or dealers.'30 Therefore, a supplier can provide a dealer with sales
targets only to the extent that the sales targets do not limit
deliveries of vehicles to dealers.'' Moreover, the supplier cannot
hinder a dealer from buying contract vehicles from other dealers
within the supplier's sales network.
c. Parts and Service Distribution
The third BER would promote consumers' access to parts and
after-sales service. First, a supplier must obligate its repairers to
provide after-sales service, in a non-discriminatory manner, to any
consumer who bought the supplier's car within the common
market.'" Therefore, an authorized repairer should honor
warranties, perform free servicing, carry out recall work, and
provide any other repair and maintenance services for all contract
vehicles and corresponding vehicles sold in the common market.'34
For example, a consumer who purchased a vehicle in France can
get any after-sales service from an authorized repairer of the
manufacturer in any member countries.
Second, the third BER requires a car manufacturer to provide
to unauthorized repairers who do not have any contractual
relationship with the manufacturer, at their request, technical

127.
128.
129.
130.

Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(f), at 38.
Explanatory Brochure,supra note 13, at 27-30.
Commission Regulation 1400/2002, para. (16), at 31.
Id. art. 4, para. 1(c), at 38.

131.

Explanatory Brochure,supra note 13, at 47-49.

132. Id. at 55.
133. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, para. (17), at 31-32.
134.

Id.
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information, diagnostic tools or equipment, or technical training
on the same condition that the supplier provides to its authorized
repairers. ' Further, a supplier cannot hinder its authorized
repairers from selling original spare parts to unauthorized
repairers." Any repairer would have the same access to parts,
information, or other necessary tools even when it does not have
any contractual relationship with the supplier. Moreover, a
supplier cannot limit an authorized repairer or parts maker's
ability to purchase or sell original spare parts or spare parts of
matching quality,' from or to any person.' Therefore, consumers,
authorized repairers, and unauthorized repairers can freely access
both original spare parts and spare parts of matching quality.
IV.

MARKET IMPACT

Under the new BER, car manufacturers cannot effectively
control the flow of vehicle sales and services among EEC member
countries as they could under the old rules. This change will
significantly change the relationship among car manufacturers,
wholesalers, dealers, and consumers. Not only would the change
bring more competition in the automotive market, but it would
also adversely affect market efficiency, as well as customer benefit.
A. Price Convergence
While the price differences of new cars have generally
decreased, especially among Western European countries, 9
customers' benefits from this trend would be limited. First, the
price differences of top selling models are still substantial,
especially between Western and Eastern European countries that
recently attained EU membership.' ° For example, the price of a
135. Id. art. 4, para. 2, at 39.
136. "Original Spare Parts" means spare parts which have the same quality as the
components used for the assembly of a vehicle. Id. art. 1, para. 1(t), at 36, art. 4, para. 1(i),
at 38.
137. "Spare Parts of Matching Quality" means spare parts which a parts maker
certifies that the parts match the quality of the original spare parts. Id. art. 1, para. 1(u), at
36. Car manufacturers can request authorized repairers to use only original spare parts for
recall or warranty service. Id. art. 4, para. 1(k), at 38.
138. Id. arts. 4, para. 1(j)-(l), at 38-39.
139. Press Release, Competition Directorate General, European Commission,
Convergence of Car Prices Improves Within EU While Remaining Constant in the Euro
Zone, IP/05/1027 (Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Convergence Press Release].
140. Competition Directorate General, European Commission, Car Prices Within the
European Union at 1 May 2005 (2005) [hereinafter Car Prices 2005], available at
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Volkswagen Polo in 2002 was 22.6 percent higher in Germany than

in Ireland.'

In 2005, it is 13.9 percent higher in Germany than

Belgium while2 its price difference between Germany and Slovenia
1
is 28 percent.

Further, the price convergence does not necessarily lower car
prices; indeed, the average price of vehicles in the common market
went up."' Generally, to minimize the impact of cross-border sales,
car manufacturers would increase prices in low-price countries, "
such as Greece and Slovenia, while lowering the price in high-price
countries such as the UK. 45 This trend would disserve customer
benefits in low-price countries, especially in Eastern European
countries and some Western European countries with high tax
rates.
While it is true that manufacturers have set different prices
among European countries in order to optimize carmakers' profit
and sales volume, the price difference also reflected differences in
customers' purchase power 16 and the tax system within
both
Europe. 7 Without addressing these problems, any effort to reduce

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/motor-vehicles/prices/2005_05 repmain_t
able.pdf.
141. Competition Directorate General, European Commission, Report on Car Price
Differentials within the European Union on 1 May 2002 (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/motor-vehicles/prices/2002_05.pdf.
142. Car Prices2005, supra note 140.
143. Compared to a year ago, car prices in May 2005 have increased 0.4 percent in the
EU, even after Eastern European countries became EU members, which generally have
lower prices than Western European countries. See Convergence Press Release, supra
note 139.
144. Car manufacturers may also provide stripped-down models to the low-price
countries. However, this cannot be a fundamental solution because the manufactures have
to increase the option-adjusted price anyway in order to prevent customers in the highprice countries from purchasing vehicles from dealers in the low-price countries.
145. It is possible that this trend may increase inter-brand competition in both lowprice and high-price countries because a carmaker may try to maintain the adjusted prices
of its products lower than competing models. However, it is also possible that the price
adjustment would result in merely general increases or decreases of prices while
maintaining the same level of price differences among competing models.
146. As of 2004, GDP per capita in Luxembourg was more than twice the EU average
while it was 55 percent below the average in Latvia. GDP per capita in Turkey which is
negotiating its new membership was 81 percent below the EU average. GDP Per Capita
Varied by One to Five Across the EU 25 Member States, EUROSTAT (Eurostat Press
available at
3,
2005,
June
75/2005,
Release
News
Lux.)
Office,
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGPPRDCATPREREL/PGE_C
ATPRERELYEAR 2005/PGECATPRERELYEAR_2005_MONTH_06/203062005-EN-BP.PDF.
147. See Q&A: Ford Needs German Fix, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS EUROPE, Nov. 15, 2004.
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the price differences is unlikely to succeed in maximizing
consumer benefits.
B. Sales Network
1. Promotion of Dealer Competition
Under the third BER, competition among dealers will be
more vigorous because the new BER substantially reduces a
supplier's ability to directly or indirectly restrain cross-border
sales. Under the selective system, a dealer can establish its sales or
delivery facilities outside its territory and actively sell vehicles.'48
The third BER will promote competition among authorized
dealers within a car manufacturer's sales network. Further, under
the exclusive system, dealers can sell vehicles to any reseller inside
or outside the territory."9 Therefore, the third BER will promote
competition among authorized dealers and other dealers outside a
car manufacturer's sales network.
Moreover, under both systems, sales through intermediaries
are allowed."'° For example, customers in Germany can make
orders to an internet seller, and the seller can purchase ordered
vehicles from a dealer in Finland by presenting the customers
mandates.' In general, these trends would enable consumers to
have better access to dealers outside the territory.
2. Promotion of Dealer Independence
Under the new regulation, dealers can make more
independent business decisions under the third BER because it
prohibits suppliers from using most of direct or indirect restraints
on vehicle trade. For example, the third BER prohibits a supplier
from directly or indirectly precluding its dealers from selling
competing models. 2 It also prohibits a supplier from requiring its
dealers to establish an independent showroom or to hire sales
148. Most manufacturers are using selective system and, until October 1, 2005, they
could effectively minimize the impact of active sales by using location clause. Weernink &
Wernle, supra note 74.
149. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. l(b), 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 38
(EC).
150. Id. art. 4, para. 1(i), at 38.
151. See Commission Regulation 1475/95, art. 3(11), 1995 O.J. (L 145) 25; Explanatory
Brochure,supra note 13, at 45-46.
152. Wim Oude Weernink, Some German Opel Dealers Will Sell Chinese Cars,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS EUROPE, Aug. 8,2005.
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persons only for the supplier's vehicles.' 3 Finally, the third BER
prohibits car manufacturers from indirectly restraining vehicle
trade by imposing sales quota, a discriminatory bonus system or
retaliatory termination of a dealership agreement. "
Therefore, dealers can freely run their businesses and sell
vehicles made by various suppliers inside or outside the territory.
For example, after seeing Opel's market share plunge, some Opel
dealers in Germany started selling a sports utility vehicle
manufactured and exported by Jiangling Motors, a Chinese car
maker, without informing Opel of the sales plan. 5' Some dealer
groups from Spain, Italy, Belgium, and The Netherlands also
considered selling the sports utility vehicle.

156

3. Free-rider Problem
Because the third BER prohibits a supplier from using most
vertical restraints on vehicle trade, a "free-rider" problem might
arise. For example, Dealer A in Germany invests in various
marketing activities, local advertisement, and customer services,
such as a large and expensive showroom and vehicles for test
driving. Then, Dealer B in Slovenia simply establishes a sales
outlet of minimum quality in Germany, '" and sells the same
vehicles at substantially lower price based on saved marketing
costs in addition to the currently existing price difference. 8
Knowing this price difference, a customer will visit Dealer A's
large showroom, collect information about vehicles, test drive the
vehicles and then go to Dealer B and purchase the same vehicle at
a lower price. 9

153. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, para. l(b), at 35, art. 5, para. 2(b), at 39.
154. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4.1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30.
155. Weernink, supra note 152.
156. Id.
157. Under the quantitative or qualitative selective system, a car maker can require
dealers operating in a territory to meet minimum quantitative or qualitative standards.
Thus, even a dealer from Slovenia should have its sales outlet or delivery point in
Germany to meet the minimum standards given to the German dealers. Explanatory
Brochure, supra note 13, at 52-55. On the other hand, the car maker would not be able to
set forth the standards high enough to resolve the free-rider problem because the new
BER prohibits any obligation rendering the sale of competing models unreasonably
difficult. Id. at 31-33.
158. For example, as of May 2005, the price of Volkswagen Polo in Slovenia was 28
percent lower than in Germany which amounted about E 2,300. Car Prices 2005, supra
note 140.
159. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 456-57.
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This free-rider problem will discourage dealers from investing
in marketing activities and customer services, thereby making
price competition among dealers more vigorous. 60 Not only do
these trends usually damage brand image of car manufacturers,
but they also limit the car makers' ability to compete among
them. '
To resolve this problem, a supplier may consider three
options: vertical minimum RPM, territorial restriction,162 and
marketing allowance. 63 The minimum RPM would not necessarily
resolve the free-rider problem because the free-rider still can
choose to keep the added margin instead of increasing the
investment in marketing and customer service, 6' or to provide
different services.' Further, territorial restrictions would also have
limited effect because it primarily purports to prohibit its dealers
from selling vehicles outside the territory rather than directly
induce the dealer investment in marketing activities. Therefore,
the marketing allowance would be a more effective method to
induce dealers to invest in marketing activities because the
allowance would be given to the dealers after monitoring their
marketing activities."' In the U.S., while the minimum RPM is per
se illegal,'67 a supplier can prohibit its dealers from selling vehicles
outside the territory to the extent it can satisfy the rule of reason."'
Further, the remuneration system which merely affects the resale
6
price, would generally be subject to the rule of reason in the U.S.1 1
However, under the third BER, the supplier cannot use any
of the above options because all three options are Hardcore
160. William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the
New Anti-trust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 986-88 (1985) (citing Lester G. Telser, Why
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86 (1960)).
161. Manufacturers driven by volume may, especially, have to lower showroom

standards and use less effort to give customers a brand experience than luxury brands can
control customer experience. Weernink, supra note 152.
162. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 457-59.
163. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 304-06 (2000).
164. Id.

165. For example, while a dealer provides customers better showrooms and test-drives,
the free-rider can provide customers an installed stereo system or an extended warranty.
A customer will then obtain information from the former dealer and purchases a vehicle
from the free-rider. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 458-59.
166. SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 305.
167. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51.
168. Id. at 57-58.
169. Bus. Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. at 735-36.
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Restrictions. From the view of the supplier, it would be
unreasonable to support a Slovenian dealer's marketing activities
in the German market. The supplier would want to give
remunerations to the dealer in order to support its marketing
activities in Slovenia. However, such a territory-based
remuneration system would be deemed a market discrimination
that is a Hardcore Restriction.7 ° Even though the Guidelines on
Vertical Restraints expressly recognize solving a free-rider
problem as one of the justifiable reasons for vertical restraints,'171 it
is unlikely to justify Hardcore Restrictions. 2
4. Downfall of Small Dealers
As dealer competition and cross-border sales increase, large
multi-brand dealers would benefit from the economy of scale
based on their sales network throughout the European market. In
such a case, small dealers would lose their ground or become subdealers of big dealers.
For example, as long as there are substantial price differences
between Germany and The Netherlands, a large dealer in
Germany will try to buy, 73 or set up, a dealership in the The
Netherlands and purchase all necessary vehicles through its dealer
in the The Netherlands. In that case, a small dealer in Germany
has two options: to keep losing market share to the large dealer or
to find a source in the The Netherlands from which it can purchase
cheaper vehicles. If the small dealer finds another small dealer in
the The Netherlands, the two dealers may not be able to
effectively compete with the sales network of the large dealer
because the large dealer can take advantage of economy of scale
by investing more money in marketing, customer services, and
logistics than the small dealer. If the small dealer finds another
large dealer in the The Netherlands to avoid the competitiveness
problem, the small dealer in the end would function like a subdealer of the large dealer.
170.

ExplanatoryBrochure, supra note 13, at 27-30.

171. Commission Notice 291/01, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, section VI, para.
1.1.2(116), 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1, 23-24 (EC).
172. Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13, at 27-30.
173. The new BER prohibits a supplier to prevent its dealers or repairers from
transferring their rights and obligations to another member who carries out the same kind
of activity within the supplier's distribution system. Commission Regulation 1400/2002,
art. 3, para. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 37 (EC); Explanatory Brochure, supra note 13, at 2730.
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As competition among dealers increases and dealers can sell
various vehicles made by competing car makers, there will be a
greater chance that large multi-brand dealers will become more
influential in the market.'74 The small dealer cannot make enough
investment on its own to compete with the multi-branded large
dealers, which can set up luxurious and large showrooms and
conduct vigorous marketing activities. According to a report, the
number of mega dealers has actually increased while overall
number of dealers has decreased.'75 Further, mergers between big
dealers have been increasing the influence of big dealers in the
market.'76 As a result, the ground for small dealers would be
reduced and, in the long-run, multi-branded mega dealers would
take dominant position in vehicle sales network.
5. Changed Relationship between Large Dealers and Car Makers
In the long run, under the third BER, the market control of
multi-brand mega dealers would increase while car makers'
control would decrease. To maintain the control over sales
network, car manufacturers may have two options: to set up their
own dealer networks or to improve their relationship with the
mega dealers. In response, some automakers are increasing the
number of sales outlets they control directly.' However, the
number of showrooms owned by manufacturers amounts only to
about three percent of total outlets in Europe, and it would not be
7 Thus, the car makers
a fundamental solution due to a cost issue."
would have to try to maintain good relationship with mega dealers.
On the other hand, because dealers are released from direct
or indirect control by car manufacturers including the exclusive
dealing obligation, dealers can exercise more control over the
market. 9 Moreover, the multi-brand mega dealers who own
174. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 449-53.
175. For example, in Germany, the market share of the top 50 dealer groups increased
by 4 percent from 2001 to 2003 while the number of outlets dropped 16 percent. Luca
Ciferri, Rise of Big Multibrand Dealers Curbs Competition: Loss of Small Sales Outlets
Hits Consumers, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS EUROPE, June 27, 2005.
176. Sylviane de Saint-Seine, Shareholder Value: Pendragon Heads Retail Stocks After
BramallBuy, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS EUROPE, May 3,2004.
177. For example, from 1999 to 2004, automakers increased the number of their own
sales outlets from 263 to 388 in France and from 197 to 340 in Germany. Luca Ciferri,
Carmakers Tighten Grip on New-car Sales: OEMs Increase Direct Sales, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS EUROPE, June 27, 2005.
178. Id.
179. Id.

334

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 29:309

community-wide sales network would have even greater market
control.
In the long-run, the relationship between car manufacturers
and mega dealers may become similar to that of department stores
and clothes manufacturers.'8 Because the third BER prohibits
suppliers from obligating dealers to purchase more than 30 percent
of the dealers' sale," car makers would need to have more than
one sales network, just as many cloth makers sell their products in
many department stores. Car makers would have to compete to
maintain a better relationship with the large dealers because those
dealers would determine which vehicles will be more vigorously
promoted and given better display space." Therefore, car
manufacturers' power in the market may be lessened while large
multi-brand dealers would become more influential.
6. Exportation to Countries outside the Community
Under the third BER, a supplier using the exclusive system
cannot limit its dealers and repairers' ability to sell vehicles or
parts to resellers. 3 Once a vehicle is sold to a reseller inside or
outside the territory, a supplier cannot control vehicle trade at all.
Therefore, a reseller can freely sell vehicles or parts to any person
inside or outside Europe.
This could be unfair because, in other countries, usually a car
manufacturer can legally limit such an indirect exportation by
limiting reseller sales. For example, a dealer in Slovenia can sell
vehicles provided by a car manufacturer to a reseller, and the
reseller again can export the vehicles to another reseller in the
U.S. Meanwhile, the same car manufacturer in the U.S. can use
vertical non-price restraints to prevent its dealers from performing

180. The clothes manufacturers can be divided into two categories: one with no brand
value and the other with substantial brand value. The car makers' position would be
similar with that of the latter because brand reputation is one of the most important
considering factors of consumers. Thus, as luxury clothes makers do, the car makers may
sell vehicles through their own dealer shops and many multi-brand mega dealers at the
same time.
181. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 1, para. 1(b), 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 35
(EC).
182.
183.

HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 459-60.
Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 4, para. 1(b), at 38.
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reseller sales and exportation of vehicles, to the extent the rule of
reason would allow.'
The actual impact of this phenomenon has been limited
because many car manufacturers did not adopt the exclusive
system.' However, theoretically, there can be significant impact as
long as the price difference between the inside and the outside of
Europe is substantial.
C. Service Network
The third BER significantly promotes consumers' access to
after-sales service. Car manufacturers must obligate their repairers
to provide warranty services to customers who purchased vehicles
anywhere within the EC.' 6 Further, unauthorized repairers can
provide full repair and maintenance services because the new BER
requires suppliers to provide them the same access to technical
information, training, and other necessary tools, and purchase
original spare parts and spare parts of matching quality from parts
makers or authorized dealers. 1'
This change will induce manufacturers to develop strategies
for better service to maintain the share in after-sales service
market' " because after-sales service has been a large source of
profit for manufacturers."' On the other hand, even though some
manufacturers are trying to limit independent repairers' access to
technical information and equipments," ° the influence of
independent repairers in after-sales service market would become
stronger, which would increase the competition within the aftersales service market. Therefore, customers would be given better
service.

184. This might have been another serious reason why many car manufacturers have
chosen selective system over exclusive system.
185. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, para. (37), at 34.
186. Id. paras. (17), at 31, (21), at 32.
187. Id. para. (26), at 33, art. 4, para. 10), at 38.
188. Jens Meiners, Auto Industry Fights for its Aftermarket Presence, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS EUROPE, Oct. 4,2004.
189. Profits from spare parts and service amounts about 40 percent. Id.
190. Sylviane de Saint Seine, AutoDistribution Threatens to Sue Carmakers,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS EUROPE, July 11, 2005.
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V. CONCLUSION

The new BER would effectively serve its legislative purpose 9
by making cross-border sales of new vehicles significantly easier,
increasing competition among dealers, and creating greater price
competition. Further, quality of after-sales service would improve.
As a result, consumers can more easily access dealers and repairers
inside or outside the territory. This trend will benefit customers in
some Western European countries, such as Germany and the UK
in which car makers have sold vehicles at higher prices than other
countries.
In spite of dramatic changes in the third BER, the automotive
market has not yet shown any corresponding changes because
many car manufacturers have chosen the quantitative selective
system and maintained the location clause in their dealership
agreements.19 After October 2005, however, the car manufacturers
can no longer maintain the location clause. 93 Even though the
dealers are moving slowly because they do not want to ruin the
longstanding relationship with car makers yet, in the long run,
fundamental change is unavoidable under the third BER.'94
These changes would entail potential problems that a more
flexible approach can resolve. The problems may adversely affect
consumer benefits and market efficiency unless the Commission
substantially changes the regulation in 2010115 after reviewing the
'
impacts and limitations of the third BER in 2008. 96
T

A. Price Convergence and Consumer Benefits
Price convergence may disadvantage the consumers residing
in countries with high tax rates or weak purchasing power. In the
end, there should be measures to reconcile substantial differences
in consumer purchase power and tax system.
In the short term, the solution may be a more flexible
application of rules. Rather than categorizing price restraints or
territory-based remuneration programs as Hardcore Restrictions,
the regulation could adopt a more flexible approach such as the
rule of reason. Under such an approach, courts could allow car
191. Comprehensive Reform Press Release, supra note 22.
192. Questions and Answers, supra note 17.
193. Commission Regulation 1400/2002, art. 12, para. 2, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 41 (EC).
194. Id. art. 3(4).
195. See id. art. 12, para. 3, at 41.
196. Id. art. 11, at 41.
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makers to use some price restraints or territory-based
remuneration programs to deal with the differences in consumer
purchase power and tax system, as long as pro-competitive effects
outweigh anti-competitive effects and consumers can share
resulting benefits.
B. Free-riderProblem
The problems of free-riders may also reduce consumer
benefits. Because of the free-rider problem, dealers may provide
low quality customer services, and inter-brand competition may be
reduced. The Guidelines for Vertical Agreement expressly
recognize that the free-rider problem may justify some vertical
restraints. Thus, theoretically, car makers can use such measures as
long as it does not constitute a Hardcore Restriction and its anticompetitive effect does not outweigh pro-competitive effect. In
reality, however, it would be difficult for car manufacturers to find
any effective measure to deal with this problem because the third
BER categorizes as Hardcore Restriction the most effective
measures including territory-based marketing allowances.'97
C. New Vehicle DistributionSystem
The new relationship between car manufacturers and dealers
may not necessarily benefit consumers. Rather, it may just transfer
power from one to another. Under the traditional model, a car
maker gives a dealer an exclusive territory for a certain period.
Based on the commitment, the dealer can aggressively invest in
sales outlets, local advertisement and customer services, and
reinvests its profits in the marketing activities based on the longterm market strategy. The car maker supports its dealer's activities
based on the dealer's investment and sales achievement in pursuit
of mutual interests. Along this line, the traditional model has
maintained its own efficiency and inter-brand competition.
Under the third BER, there is substantial possibility that in
the long run, the relationship between the car makers and the
multi-brand mega dealers may become similar with that of
department stores and clothes manufacturers. There is no territory
restriction, no exclusive dealing, and almost no reason for dealers
to try to maintain a close relationship with a car manufacturer as
they did in the traditional system. Rather, based on their increased
197. Id. para. (12), at 31.
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market control, the mega dealers may maintain retail prices at a
certain level and may try to control vehicle trade among member
states. These changes would not necessarily increase the intrabrand competition while it may adversely affect the inter-brand
competition. Thus, there should be a thorough review to
determine which model would better serve the goals of market
integration, market efficiency, and consumer benefit.
D. Hardcore Restrictions: Per Se Rules
The third BER expressly allows certain vertical restraints
notwithstanding their anti-competitive purpose and effects. For
example, under the exclusive system, the third BER allows a
supplier to prohibit active sales even though it is generally true
that the supplier prohibits active sales with anti-competitive
purposes and the prohibition would not have any pro-competitive
effect.198 Under the selective system, the third BER basically does
the same in allowing a supplier to prohibit reseller sales. "9
Therefore, the competition rule allows direct restraints on trade
with anti-competitive purposes and effects, while it prohibits some
vertical price or non-price restraints even when the restraints have
pro-competitive purposes and effects by categorizing them as
Hardcore Restrictions.
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